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Abstract 
Scholars have recently started to pay more attention to the role of legislatures in managing the risk 
of ministerial drift in parliamentary governments. In this article, we present and empirically test the 
implications of a simple model of parliamentary involvement in policymaking. Our model shows 
that involvement depends on the interaction between, on the one hand, the preference divergence 
between the responsible minister and its coalition partner(s) and, on the other hand, 1) the formal 
scope for policy drift and 2) the institutional arrangements at the disposal of the executive for 
influencing legislative proceedings. These expectations are tested using original data on legislative 
involvement in the transposition of 821 directives into national law in fifteen European Union 
member states. We find strong support for our predictions. The risk of ministerial drift and the 
formal scope for policy drift powerfully interact to increase the likelihood of parliamentary 
involvement, but the extent of government’s control of the legislative agenda, its advantage in 
scheduling amendments and the ease with which it can pass a motion of confidence dampen the 
likelihood of parliamentary activism at given levels of conflict. 
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Introduction 
The study of the role of legislatures in parliamentary policymaking is experiencing a revival. The 
most defining feature of parliamentary systems has always been the fact that the government is 
answerable to an elected assembly. Indeed, in classical liberal political thought, the government is 
actually seen as a mere executor of the laws and policies decided by the legislature and, following 
the early British and Swedish examples, democratic development hinged upon the strengthening of 
parliamentary powers. 
However, once democracy has consolidated, scholars observed, and some lamented, the dominance 
of the executives in parliamentary governments. Bryce’s (1921) disapproval of the decline of 
legislatures in modern democracies may have been obfuscated by an improbably idyllic image of a 
golden age, but the growing complexity of modern societies, the expansion of public policies with 
their administrative apparatus and the development of modern mass media and disciplined party 
organizations have indeed shifted the focus of scholarly attention over the last four decades to the 
cabinet government (Newton and Van Deth, 2005: 102-6). In Europe, regional integration appears to 
have further eroded the lawmaking powers of national parliaments by transferring policy 
competences to the supranational arena where national executives enjoy extensive prerogatives (e.g. 
Goetz and Hix, 2000). 
Notwithstanding the considerable progress in the comparative study of legislative organization in 
the past decades, Laver (2006:122) resolutely asserts in a recent review that ‘the most important 
political job for the “legislature” in a parliamentary government is … not legislating at all, but 
making and breaking governments’. Indeed, most of the advanced theoretical and empirical work 
has centered on the formation and dissolution of governments, the allocation of cabinet portfolios 
and cabinet duration (see, for instance, the reviews of Diermeier, 2006; Gallagher, et al., 2006; 
Gamm and Huber, 2002; Laver and Schonfield, 1998). 
More recently, attention has shifted to the mechanisms maintaining a parliamentary government. 
The problem has been framed in conventional principal-agent terms. In a chain of delegation, 
members of the legislature confer political authority to the prime minister who, at least formally, 
distributes portfolio responsibilities among cabinet members (Strøm, 2000). The formation of 
parliamentary governments therefore involves the delegation of considerable discretion to ministers 
who are in charge of administering existing policies and drafting new legislation within their 
jurisdiction (Gallagher, et al., 2006: 43; Laver and Shepsle, 1996,1994). During the life of 
government, ministers may adopt measures and draft new initiatives to shift the policy towards their 
preferred direction, but this could be detrimental to colleagues and other political actors. This risk is 
exacerbated in coalition governments where intra-cabinet conflict is likely to be higher than in 
single-party governments. Government maintenance therefore relies on a set of conflict management 
institutions. For instance, coalition policy documents are used to set the likely boundaries of future 
conflicts (Mitchell, 1999: 274). At the cabinet level, junior ministers are employed to shadow 
ministers belonging to other coalition parties (Thies, 2001) and the doctrines of individual 
ministerial and collective cabinet responsibility facilitate the management of crises and disaccord 
within the cabinet (Gallagher, et al., 2006: 40-3; Rhodes, 2006). 
The renewed attention to the role of legislatures in parliamentary policymaking rests on the 
centrality of legislative institutions in managing agency problems. Martin and Vanberg (2005) have 
recently modeled coalition policymaking as a process whereby a party decides whether to accept  or 
amend (at a cost) a policy proposal made by a minister belonging to coalition partner. In making 
such a proposal, the minister will take into consideration the compromise policy that will emerge if 
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the proposal is challenged, the opportunity costs of drafting the proposal and the opportunity cost for 
the coalition partner for challenging it. The model’s core expectation is that the coalition party will 
rely more heavily on legislative scrutiny the greater the risk of ministerial drift. In the empirical 
application of the model, Martin and Vanberg investigate the incidence of legislative amendments to 
366 ministerial drafts introduced before the Dutch and German lower chambers between 1982 and 
1994 and show that the (weighted) policy issue distance between the party controlling the ministry 
responsible for drafting the bill and the coalition partner party significantly increases the number of 
article changes made to the bill. In related works (Martin, 2004; Martin and Vanberg, 2004), they 
also demonstrate that government issue divisiveness lengthens the legislative process and delay the 
introduction of bills to the legislature. In essence, legislative review is a key resource for monitoring 
ministerial drift and maintaining government. 
Our contribution to this literature is manifold. First, we will empirically test the core expectation of 
Martin and Vanberg’s model on fifteen European parliamentary democracies. More interestingly, 
broadening the geographical coverage will allow us to examine how institutions within parliaments 
interact with the risk of ministerial drift in affecting legislative review.2 We will show that, at high 
levels of conflict between a minister responsible for implementing a policy and her coalition 
partners, the likelihood of parliamentary involvement decreases the greater the governmental control 
of the legislative agenda, the stronger the prerogatives enjoyed by the executive in offering 
amendments towards the end of the legislative process and the easier it is to invoke and carry 
motions of confidence. Our point of departure is the fact that member states of the European Union 
(E.U.) have to implement the legislative measures that are adopted at the E.U. level. Some of these 
measures, the regulations, are directly applicable, while others, the directives, allow member states 
the choice of form and methods of national implementation, as long as the policy objectives are 
achieved. A directive can therefore be transposed using only executive measures in a member state, 
while it may involve the parliament in another state. We contend that parliamentary involvement in 
the transposition of E.U. directives is a indicator of legislative review and that it varies 
systematically as a function of the risk of ministerial drift and of the parliamentary institutions 
regulating the legislative process and legislative-executive relations. 
Large-N studies of comparative legislative-executive politics are relatively rare because of the 
difficulty to control for a wide range of potentially disturbing factors. The use of E.U. directives is 
particularly appealing because these measures set the broad policy boundaries that are common to 
all member countries. Additionally, it allows us to test a supplementary hypothesis concerning the 
circumstances favoring legislative involvement. Directives vary in terms of the implementing 
discretion they grant to national administrations. Some are highly prescriptive and limit tightly the 
room of maneuver for national implementation, other measures confer considerable latitude. Highly 
prescriptive directives offer fewer opportunities to the minister responsible for national 
implementation for shifting the policy towards her preferred direction and weaker incentives for 
coalition partners to intervene in the transposition process.3 Ministers have instead more leeway 
 
2 We are aware of only the work of Döring (1995a; 1995b) that examines the impact of parliamentary institutions on 
legislative activity across several European countries. Döring shows that the greater control the government exercises on 
the legislative proceedings the lower the legislative output. This result holds for several controlling factors (Döring, 
1995b), but the interaction between agenda control and ministerial drift is not investigated. Döring also speculates that 
only the most conflictual proposals are likely to go through parliament. 
3 This is not to say that the minister may be tempted to comply only partially with the obligations set in E.U. law, at the 
risk of facing an infringement procedure and, eventually, a judgment of failure to comply of the European Court of 
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when they have to transpose measures that leave ample room of maneuver for national 
implementation. If the minister holds extreme views, this freedom to act cannot be seen favorably by 
coalition parties, which would prefer to rely on the legislative process to review the policy. In this 
article, we will provide empirical support for the proposition according to which, at high levels of 
risk of ministerial drift, the likelihood of parliamentary involvement increases the greater the 
implementing discretion granted to member states in the relevant directive. 
We will proceed as follows. In the next section, we develop a simple model of policymaking in a 
European parliamentary system that has to comply with an E.U. directive and we derive two key 
expectations. Next, we illustrate the data we have collected and the operationalization of the 
dependent and independent variables. The last section presents the result of our analysis. 
 
A Model of Policymaking in European Parliamentary Systems 
Behind any process of modeling there is a trade-off between accuracy and tractability which requires 
a well-thought choice between those details that are included and those that are abstracted away. Our 
model incorporates the following core features: 1) E.U. directives are addressed to member states 
which have to adopt national measures to achieve their policy objectives within a time limit, 2) 
directives allow member states the choice of form and methods of implementation and grant 
different degrees of discretion to comply with their provisions (Franchino, 2004,2007), 3) cabinet 
ministers are in charged of overseeing this process of transposition (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 
2000; Keading, 2007; Mastenbroek, 2003), hence, as Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2006: 43) put it, 
they enjoy ‘a near monopoly on policy initiation’ in their area of departmental jurisdiction4, 4) 
lastly, executive-legislative relations in parliamentary systems must be seen through the lenses of 
the key actors, political parties. 
In its most stylized form, transposition should therefore be modeled as a process whereby a partisan 
cabinet minister confronts a directive setting policy objectives with some discretionary boundaries 
and makes a policy proposal to a parliamentary support coalition for the government.5 Consider 
therefore a coalition of two parties. The moves of this game are illustrated in Figure 1. The E.U. 
measure s(e,d) that needs national transposition is characterized by a specific policy content e, a 
point on the real line ℜ, and by a degree of implementing discretion d granted by the E.U. legislators 
to national authorities, where d ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that e = 0. 
 
[ FIGURE 1 HERE ] 
 
The directive falls under the jurisdiction of minister M, belonging to one coalition party, which, 
therefore, sets the agenda by proposing a transposition route, characterized by an indicator variable 
T∈{E,L} that takes the letter E if the executive is solely involved in the implementation of the 
directive and L if also the legislature takes parts in the process. Its coalition partner P chooses either 
to accept M’s proposal or to propose the alternative route. Since, as it will be shown shortly, the 
 
Justice and a penalty payment. However, the more detailed the legislation, the easier would be to build a case of non-
compliance and the higher the likelihood of facing a negative Court ruling. 
4 As Mastenbroek (2003) notes, the implementation of some directives require coordination across departments. Since 
our interest is on executive-legislative relations we will leave inter-departmental coordination to further research. 
5 On government coalition and parliamentary support coalition see Laver (2006:128). Some features of this model are 
common in the literature (see, for instance, Baron, 1998; Heller, 2001b; Huber, 1996b; Martin and Vanberg, 2005; 
Tsebelis, 2002: 82-4, 91-105). 
minister always prefers the executive to the legislative path, this means that the coalition partner has 
the power to revert the implementation from the executive to the legislative route, but it does so at a 
cost c > 0. The latter implementation path is costly as the party has to commit its own resources to 
the transposition process instead of delegating it to the executive. Along the lines suggested by 
Martin and Vanberg (2005:95) and Strøm (2000: 272), c captures resource and opportunity costs 
incurred in challenging the ministerial proposal in the legislature. 
The minister’s party and its coalition partner have single-peaked preferences represented by ideal 
points m and p on the real line ℜ. Each player’s utility from the final policy outcome x is the linear 
loss function, respectively U(x) = - |x - i| for i = m, p. For simplicity, we assume p ≥ 0, since results 
are symmetric for negative values. 
At the implementation stage, the actor(s) in charge of transposition set(s) the national implementing 
measure(s) nj subject to ⏐x- e⏐ = ⏐x⏐≤ d where j = M, P. The final policy outcome x cannot exceed 
the discretionary boundary established in the E.U. law. 
If the executive route E is chosen, T*=E, the minister is solely responsible for transposition. Her 
measure coincides with the final outcome, that is nM ≡ x. These outcomes are as follows: x= m if 
⏐m⏐≤ d, x= d if m > d and x=-d if m < - d. If the coalition partner objects to the ministerial draft and 
transposition follows the legislative route L, the outcome is weighted on the optimum national 
transposition measures of M and P, that is x = anM + (1- a)nP where nM takes the same values of 
those of the executive route, while nP= p if p ≤ d, x= d otherwise. In other words, following Martin 
and Vanberg (2005:95), the outcome of the legislative route is a ‘coalition compromise’ located in 
the Pareto set, which is defined by [nM,nP]. The exact location of this compromise is determined by 
a which is bounded between zero and one and measures the degree of governmental control of 
parliamentary proceedings. If a=1, the government has complete control and the outcomes are those 
most preferred by the minister. As a diminishes, the minister gradually loses her ability to 
manipulate parliamentary proceedings, at a=0.5 the two parties are equally influential in 
determining the coalition compromise. Finally, since we have assumed that the legislative route 
imposes resource and bargaining costs c on the coalition, the players’ utility function takes the 
following formulation in this circumstance: UL(x) = - |x – p| - c. 
The coalition party P objects to the executive route if and only if the utility from the outcome of the 
legislative route exceeds that from the executive route, that is iff (x) > (x). Table 1 illustrates 
the utility of this party under different preference configurations and implementation paths and the 
conditions under which it will prefer the legislative route. 
L
PU
E
PU
 
[ TABLE 1 HERE ] 
 
The minister will propose the transposition route T that maximizes its utility, given the policy 
outcomes x and the likelihood of an objection by party P. The minister prefers the executive to the 
legislative path since  = - |x – m| ≥ = - |x – p| - c under all possible preference configurations. 
She is indifferent between the two paths only if there are no bargaining costs in the legislature (c=0) 
and if she fully controls legislative proceedings (a=1). The minister’s subgame-perfect strategy 
consists of proposing the legislative route when the coalition partner objects to the executive route. 
In other words, we have the following proposition. 
E
MU
L
MU
 
Proposition: The implementation of the E.U. directive involves the legislature, that is T*=L, 
when ⏐m⏐< d 
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  if p < d and (1 – a) |m – p| > c 
if p > d and (1 - a) (d – m) > c 
when m > d 
  if p < d and (1 - a) (d - p) > c 
when m < -d 
  if p < d and (1 - a) (d + p) > c 
if p> d and 2d (1-a) > c 
Otherwise, transposition will follow the executive route, that is T*=E. 
 
[ FIGURE 2 HERE ] 
 
Figure 2 provides an illustration of this proposition. There are three important considerations to 
derive.6 Firstly, legislative involvement is more likely as discretion increases. Formally, the 
conditions of this proposition are more likely to be satisfied as d increases because its value is more 
likely to exceed one of the four thresholds [m +
a
c
−1 , a
c
−1 ± p, )1(2 a
c
− ]. In Figure 2, it is possible 
to imagine how the executive route area shrinks as discretion increases. In other words, enough 
latitude should be granted to member states in the relevant E.U. law for the coalition party P to be 
interested in being involved in implementation and shaping the final policy outcome. Greater 
discretion not only gives this party a greater chance of obtaining its ideal policy, but it also increases 
the risk of a distributive loss caused by the sole implementation of a biased minister, belonging to 
the other coalition party. Party P would therefore prefer to be involved. 
Secondly, legislative involvement is more likely as conflict between the two coalition parties 
increases. Formally, this conflict is gauged by |m – p| in the proposition and, as it increases, it is 
likely to exceed the threshold
a
c
−1 . It is intuitive to understand that, as conflict increases, the 
minister becomes more biased and the distributive loss for its coalition partner increases. The latter 
would therefore be more inclined to opt for the legislative route to limit ministerial drift. In Figure 2, 
as we move away from the dotted line representing the identity of party preferences, legislative 
involvement is more likely. 
Notice that discretion and conflict interact. A precondition for conflict to affect the choice of route is 
that the level of discretion is greater than zero. At the extreme case of d = 0, a directive is transposed 
using only the executive route, regardless of the level of conflict within the government. As d 
increases, the conflict term |m – p| in the proposition is more likely to come into play because the 
two conditions, ⏐m⏐< d and p < d, are more likely to be fulfilled. More intuitively, directives 
allowing national authorities greater room of maneuver for implementation offer greater 
opportunities for national actors to shape the final policy output. The heterogeneity of the 
parliamentary support coalition plays therefore a greater role in determining the relative importance 
of the executive and the legislature in policy implementation. These considerations lead us to the 
first testable hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
 7
6 A fourth and relatively straightforward result of the model is the negative impact of the opportunity costs of 
parliamentary activity c on the likelihood of opting for the legislative route. We will not take this issue further. 
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Hypothesis 1: More intense conflict between the minister in charge of transposition and the 
coalition partners increases parliamentary involvement in the transposition of E.U. directives as the 
implementing discretion granted to member states increases. 
 
Thirdly, the more the minister can rely on governmental prerogatives to exercise control over the 
proceedings of the legislature, the less likely implementation will follow the legislative path. 
Formally, as a approaches one, it is harder to surpass the threshold c in the five conditions listed in 
the proposition. In the extreme case of complete control by the government (a=1) and positive 
bargaining costs in the legislature (c>0), transposition should take place following only the 
executive route. This special case is akin to Laver and Shepsle’s (1996) model in which ministers 
enjoy complete autonomy in their policy jurisdictions. The other coalition party P has no incentive 
to pay the opportunity costs of the legislature route if the minister under which the policy 
jurisdiction falls can rely on strong institutional tools in the legislature to align the resulting coalition 
compromise with her views. Graphically, the executive funnel in Figure 2 enlarges as a approaches 
unity. 
Conflict between coalition parties and the parameter a interact negatively, as it can be clearly seen 
from the first condition of the proposition. In other words, the impact of conflict on parliamentary 
involvement is conditional upon the tools that are available to the government to control legislative 
proceedings. The weaker these tools, the more likely conflict will increase the likelihood of 
parliamentary involvement. We have therefore a second testable hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: More intense conflict between the minister in charge of transposition and the 
coalition partners increases parliamentary involvement in the transposition of E.U. directives the 
weaker the government’s control tools of legislative proceedings. 
 
In the reminder of the article, we subject these two hypotheses to a systematic empirical 
investigation. 
 
Data and Operationalization 
Parliamentary involvement 
We have collected information on 20,824 implementing measures of 821 directives adopted in 
fifteen member states7 between December 1978 and February 2004 from the CELEX dataset of the 
European Union.8 The directives have been chosen randomly from the dataset and the implementing 
measures have been classified according to whether they have been adopted by national parliaments, 
by the cabinet or other executive institutions, such as ministries or national agencies, or by 
subnational authorities, such as the German and Austrian Länder, the regions in Italy and Belgium, 
or the autonomous province of the Åland Islands in Finland. We have disregarded instruments 
adopted by subnational authorities as their study is beyond the scope of this work. Additionally, it is 
not uncommon to see measures listed in the datasets which have been adopted before the date of 
adoption of the directive. Since our model starts with a directive that needs national transposition, 
we have excluded these acts. Finally, for a given member state, directives that have been adopted 
 
7 These are the pre-2004 enlargement member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
8 CELEX is not accessible anymore. Its content has been migrated to the EUR-Lex dataset, available at eur-lex.europa.eu. 
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prior to the enlargement to this state or where the date of adoption of national measures is missing 
have been dropped. In conclusion, the final dataset consists of 8,643 executive and 1,064 legislative 
measures implementing between 142 (Finland) and 555 (Italy) directives, for a sum total of 6,089 
observations at the directive-state level. 
We have initially defined parliamentary involvement in transposition as the number of national 
implementation measures that involve the parliament divided by the total number of executive and 
legislative acts transposing a given directive, hence excluding subnational and uncoded measures. 
This measure, bounded between zero and one, is not distributed normally. The Jarque-Bera test 
statistic (16,857) rejects the null hypothesis that the data come from a normal distribution at the .01 
level. Only 6.3 percent of the observations do not take the values of zero or one. The vast majority 
consists of transposition processes either with legislative acts only or without them.  Therefore, we 
will not lose too much information and the estimation results will be more robust if we use an 
dichotomous dependent variable, parliamentary involvement, that takes the value of one if at least 
one national instrument of implementation has been adopted by the parliament in the process of 
transposition of a given directive in a given member state. 
 
Implementing discretion granted to national authorities 
We employ the legislative procedures used to adopt the directives as proxies of the degree of 
discretion granted to national authorities in transposition. Directives adopted by the Council in 
unanimity should be those allowing the greatest room of maneuver to implement a measure. To the 
extent that directives are designed to prescribe and proscribe specific policy practices of member 
states, the veto player in this circumstance is the Council minister wanting the greatest autonomy. 
Excessive latitude in implementation could be problematic though, as it is likely to allow such wide 
variance in national regulatory standards which could question the purpose of an E.U. measure in 
the first place. This is why we should expect lower discretion when a directive is adopted by 
qualified majority voting in the Council. Here, the pivotal minister has a more moderate position and 
is more willing to trade its own policy autonomy for greater harmonization of policy practices across 
the E.U.. Crucially, this is done in collusion with the European Commission, who has the monopoly 
of proposal power. To the extent that this institution is in favor of the underlying policy shift, it 
prefers less to more national discretion and will make a proposal to elicit the support from this 
pivotal minister.9
This leads to the final observation. Directives adopted by the Commission should be those allowing 
the smallest room of maneuver. When it takes its own acts and, therefore, favors the policy shift, the 
Commission is likely to give more weight to policy harmonization than to national administrative 
autonomy. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, national policy autonomy is not as valued by the 
Commission as it is by ministers heading the relevant national departments. Secondly, more 
prescriptive legislation is likely to facilitate the Commission in overseeing compliance, as national 
authorities enjoy less discretion in interpreting E.U. laws. 
Discretion is therefore an ordinal variable that takes the value of zero in case of a Commission 
directive, of one for a Council directive adopted by qualified majority and two for one adopted 
under unanimity voting. A Council directive adopted under unanimity voting should give national 
 
9 Franchino (2007) formally proves these statements and provides supporting empirical evidence. 
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parliaments the greatest opportunity to shape policy outcomes, more so than directives adopted 
under majority voting and even more than the more prescriptive Commission directives.10
 
Conflict between minister and coalition partners 
We have taken the following steps to measure the intensity of conflict between the minister and the 
coalition partners. First, each directive has been assigned to one (and only one) policy area 
following the classification headings of EUR-Lex. We have then allocated a responsible minister to 
each policy area, as illustrated in Table 2. This is the minister that is formally in charge of the 
transposition of the directive.11
 
[ TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
We have then recorded the left-right positions of the parties in government and identified the party 
of the leading minister at the time of adoption of each national measure implementing a given 
directive. The absolute difference between the position of the leading minister and that of the 
farthest coalition party on the left-right scale measures the intensity of conflict underpinning the 
adoption on this measure. Where more than one implementing instrument has been adopted, conflict 
intensity is the mean value across all the (executive and legislative) national transposition measures 
of the directive.12
For the positions of the parties on the left-right scale, we have used Marks and Steenbergen’s (1999) 
dataset which collates data from five expert surveys. Values are standardized between zero and one, 
where zero indicates that a party is at the extreme left of the ideological spectrum and one indicates 
that it is at the extreme right. For governments formed after January 2003, we have employed Benoit 
and Laver’s (2006) estimates, standardized between zero and one. The positions of the parties from 
Luxembourg, which are missing in Marks and Steenbergen’s dataset, have instead been determined 
following Gabel and Huber’s (2000) method for extracting left-right estimates from the manifesto 
research project dataset. These values are also appropriately standardized. 
Data on government coalitions and portfolio allocations are taken from Müller and Strøm (2000), 
complemented and updated with data from Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (2000) and the Political 
Data Yearbooks of the European Journal of Political Research. For minority governments, we have 
computed the level of conflict on the basis of the parliamentary support coalition for the 
government, as defined by Laver (2006: 128). These parties are either those which supported the 
 
10 This operationalization leaves the European Parliament out. Franchino (2007) shows that, in most circumstances, the 
Parliament is likely to prefer lower national discretion than the pivotal Council minister, especially if the Council and 
the Parliament do not share the same policy views. Therefore, we could have coded those directives adopted under 
codecision, the procedure where the Parliament can shape the final EU measure the most, as granting less discretion than 
directives adopted by a qualified majority of the Council’s members only (but more than Commission’s directives). This 
alternative measurement does no change the results. Therefore, since the influence of the Parliament is likely to be only 
moderate and is conditional on factors that we do not consider here, we opted for the simpler three-factor measurement. 
11 Since some measures may cut across policy areas, one or two other ministers may play a coordinating role (see 
Mastenbroek, 2003). However, any measure has objectives that predominantly fall under one of the policy areas listed in 
Table 1. This allows us to assign the directive to one (and only one) leading minister. 
12 The measurement of conflict intensity is similar to that of government issue divisiveness employed by Martin and 
Vanberg (2004; 2005). We will not use the variable opposition issue divisiveness, measuring the policy distance between 
the minister and opposition parties. Our model is based on a parliamentary support coalition of parties M and P, hence it 
does not produce any expectation with regard to opposition parties. Moreover, the coefficient of opposition issue 
divisiveness is insignificant in both Martin and Vanberg’s studies. 
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formal government investiture, those which offered external support or, as a last resort, those closest 
to the government parties on the left-right scale. Information on parliamentary seats, external 
support and vote of investiture is also taken from the Political Data Yearbooks. 
According to hypothesis 1, parties in a heterogeneous coalition prefer greater parliamentary 
involvement in the policy process, while directives granting ample implementing discretion to 
member states offer these parties the opportunity to intervene. Discretion and conflict intensity 
should therefore interact positively and increase the likelihood of parliamentary involvement. 
 
Parliamentary institutions 
We will consider four sets of parliamentary institutions, mirroring the decision-making process 
taking placed inside parliamentary systems. These are the tools employed to control the legislative 
agenda, the amendment prerogatives of the government, the vote of confidence procedure and the 
bicameral nature of legislatures. 
Control of the legislative agenda: The extent to which the government controls the legislative 
agenda varies considerably across European democracies. For instance, at one extreme, we have the 
relatively weak British Parliament. Its plenary agenda is set by the government, its committees play 
a secondary role and their amendments are attached to the original government bill without 
rewriting. The committee agenda and the debate are controlled by the government and, if not 
adopted, the bill dies at the end of session. Hence, a bill’s lifespan does not exceed one year. At the 
other extreme, the Dutch Parliament has far more institutional means at its disposal. The plenary and 
the committees determine their own agenda. There is neither advance limitation nor possibility of 
closure of debate and a bill never dies. Agenda control measures the set of institutional features at 
the disposal of the government to control the legislative agenda. According to Döring (1995c), there 
are seven core parliamentary institutions that measure the relative importance of the parliament and 
the government in controlling this agenda: the rules to determine the agenda of the plenary, the 
degree of restrictions imposed on the legislature to propose money bills, the timing of committee 
versus plenary involvement in the decision-making process, the power of committees to rewrite 
government bills, the rules governing the timetable of committee proceedings, the rules curtailing 
the debate before the final vote in the plenary and the maximum lifespan of a bill pending approval. 
Döring has produced, for each variable, a score for eighteen west European democracies and this 
data can be used to produce an encompassing index of agenda control. 
For our purposes, we have excluded the rules on money bills because the vast majority of E.U. 
legislation is regulatory in nature, we have then performed a factor analysis of Döring’s dataset, 
weighted each variable with the first factor loadings and normalized the weighted sum.13 Agenda 
control is an index of the relative institutional power of the parliament and the government in 
controlling the policy agenda or, alternatively, the degree of executive dominance in the legislative 
proceedings. It ranges from zero to one, with higher values measuring greater government control.  
According to hypothesis 2, greater governmental control of the parliamentary agenda should 
dampen the incentives of a partner party to intervene in the policy process. Agenda control and 
conflict intensity should therefore interact negatively and reduce parliamentary involvement. 
 
13 The data can be described by a single underlying dimension. The first factor explains 80 percent of the variance and 
the eigenevalue of the second factor is lower than one. The normalized value is produced in two steps. First, we have 
subtracted from the weighted sum the minimum weighted sum value and divided the resulting figure by the difference 
between the maximum and the minimum. The results are then subtracted from one so that higher values measure greater 
government control. A similar procedure has been employed by Tsebelis (2002: 104). 
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Amendment prerogatives of the government: Heller (2001b) has recently analyzed how the 
prerogatives enjoyed by the executive in offering amendments towards the end of the legislative 
process is advantageous to the minister in whose jurisdiction a bill falls and may be used to punish 
recalcitrant coalition partners. We have therefore used the institutional details collected by Heller 
(2001b: 783) for E.U. member states and developed a index of amendment prerogatives that 
measures the extent of government amendment authority. Amendment prerogatives takes the value 
of one if there is no formal government advantage on amendments (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Luxembourg and Britain), two if there are some government prerogatives on amendments 
(Germany, Ireland, and Portugal), and three if the government has last offer authority or gatekeeping 
power on amendments (for the remaining seven countries). Greater government powers at the end of 
the legislative process are likely to dissuade refractory coalition partners to press for legislative 
policymaking. Amendment prerogatives and conflict intensity should therefore interact negatively 
and reduce the likelihood of parliamentary involvement. 
Vote of confidence: The vote of confidence is the most fundamental ‘procedural peak’ of 
parliamentary government (Laver, 2006: 122) and it has been subject to theoretical (Baron, 1998; 
Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; Huber, 1996b) and empirical scrutiny (Huber, 1996a; Huber and 
McCarty, 2001). We consider here the vote of confidence procedure that is used after government 
formation, where a motion is attached to specific policy issues in the context of legislative debates. 
We have used the information available from Huber (1996b:271), complemented with our analysis 
for Austria and Greece, and ranked countries according to the easiness to win a motion of 
confidence. Confidence vote ranges from one to seven. Member states with less demanding voting 
rules to carry the motion and without prerequisites to invoke the procedure are ranked higher.14 
Formal models investigate how this procedure allows the executive to exercise control over policy 
outcomes and increases intra-coalition cohesiveness (Baron, 1998; Diermeier and Feddersen, 1998; 
Huber, 1996b). It is therefore plausible that confidence motions that are easier to invoke and carry 
confer upon the executive greater governmental control on parliamentary proceedings. Following 
this logic, confidence vote and conflict intensity should therefore interact negatively and reduce 
parliamentary involvement. 
Upper Houses:  Lastly, to the extent that upper houses are present and can influence the legislative 
process, we should expect that their involvement represents an additional impediment to the 
government’s ability to control legislative outcomes. The policy effects of bicameralism has been 
well documented (e.g. Bräuninger and König, 1999; Heller, 1997,2001c; Tsebelis and Money, 
1995,1997), but the question as to whether a more powerful upper chamber increases the likelihood 
of legislative involvement has not been addressed systematically.15
We employ Lijphart’s (1999:212) index of bicameralism which ranks democracies according to the 
degree of symmetry and congruency (i.e. similarity of composition). Countries with symmetrical 
and incongruent upper chambers top the ranking, while those with unicameral parliaments are at the 
 
14 The ranking is as follows: 1 if there is no procedure (Austria), 2 if there are prerequisites to invoke the procedure and 
an absolute majority is necessary to approve the motion, hence abstentions are nays votes (Spain), 3 in case of absolute 
majority and no prerequisites (Germany), 4 if there are prerequisites to invoke the procedure and a simple majority is 
sufficient to approve the motion (Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Sweden), 5 in case of no 
prerequisites and simple majority (Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and Britain), 6 if there are prerequisites and an absolute 
majority is necessary to reject the motion, hence abstentions are ayes votes (France), 7 for no prerequisites and an 
absolute majority to reject (Belgium). 
15 Theoretically, bicameralism should reduce legislative productivity (e.g. Tsebelis and Money, 1997), but Cutrone and 
McCarty (2006: 184) conclude in a recent review that the empirical evidence is mixed. 
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bottom. Since governments in parliamentary systems with strong bicameral features have weaker 
control over legislative proceedings, bicameralism and conflict intensity should interact positively 
and increase the likelihood parliamentary involvement. 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of our dependent and independent variables. 
 
[ TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Analysis of the Findings 
Directives are adopted at the supranational level and then transposed by the member states. The 
structure of our dataset appears therefore hierarchical. We have two levels of analysis, countries and 
directives, with the first one nested into the second. Many of the directives are implemented in most 
countries. The implementation route choice on each individual directive varies across countries as a 
function of the level of conflict within the government in the policy area of the particular piece of 
legislation, as well as the institutional rules guiding the legislative–executive relationship. The latter 
set of effects varies by country, rather than by piece of legislation. However, the interesting aspect 
of this relationship is how the probability of involving the parliament depends on the combination of 
implementation discretion determined by the directive, the level of policy conflict within the 
government and the institutional arrangements of the particular state.  
In order to assess whether there is significant variation in the probability of parliamentary 
involvement at the directive level, we have estimated a two-level random effects ANOVA model.16 
The coefficient of the directive-level variance component is 1.054, with a standard error of 0.100 
(decision-level N= 6,089, directive-level N = 724). This value is different from zero at a level of 
significance above 0.01 (Wald test statistic is 110.2), meaning that a significant proportion of the 
variance in the probability of parliamentary involvement is attributable to differences between 
directives, therefore supporting the expectation that our dataset is structured in several levels. 
Ignoring the multilevel structure of a dataset could lead to downwardly biased standard errors and 
incorrect rejection the null hypotheses (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002: 219-20). Unsurprisingly, the 
probabilities of parliamentary involvement in the transposition of a given directive are positively 
correlated across member states. Cluster correlation violates the assumption of independence of 
observations required by a standard probit regression model, we will therefore estimate a multilevel 
model. The country level is modeled by the institutional variables as well as by clustering of the 
standard errors for correlation within each country. We also employ robust standard errors. 
Our first hypothesis stipulates that the effect of the intensity of conflict on the probability of 
parliamentary involvement varies as a function of the degree of implementing discretion embedded 
into a directive. The causal effect of the lower-level conflict intensity variable is conditioned by the 
higher-level discretion variable. This is a classic case of causal heterogeneity or cross-level 
interaction. Multilevel models with a random intercept and a random coefficient for the lower-level 
interacting variable are better suited at examining cross-level interactions than so-called interactive 
models17 because they do not assume that the error components at the higher levels of analysis are 
 
16 This analysis of cross-level variation follows Steenbergen and Jones (2002:224,231). We opted for binomial model 
with a probit link function because parliamentary involvement reflects an underlying interval variable. Hence its 
cumulative distribution is normal. 
17 Interactive models include in the regression higher-level variables and the interactions of these variables with lower-
level predictors (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002:220-1). 
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equal to zero (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002:221). Our second hypothesis requires us to investigate 
the interaction between conflict intensity and the country-level institutional factors. Here, the effect 
of conflict on the likelihood of parliamentary involvement is moderated by the procedural tools 
available to the government for influencing legislative proceedings. Finally, we included eight 
directive-level dummy variables to control for policy-specific influences, using agriculture as the 
baseline category.18
 
[ TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
In Table 4, we present the coefficients and robust standard errors of the regression. The model to the 
left include a random slope in order to let the effect of conflict vary across directives. The model on 
the right presents country cluster adjusted robust standard errors. The results are very similar. The 
significance of our results is hence not sensitive to within country clustering. The substantive 
interpretation of the coefficients of a probit model, especially if it contains interaction terms, is not 
straightforward. For instance, the marginal effect of conflict intensity on the probability of 
parliamentary involvement depends on the values of the conditioning variables (i.e. discretion and 
the four institutional variables) and of the policy dummies. Even if we use a directive on agriculture 
policy as the baseline comparison, that is we set the policy dummies equal to zero, the interpretation 
of the coefficient of conflict intensity in Table 4 is meaningless because three conditioning variables, 
amendment prerogatives, confidence vote and bicameralism, do not have zero values. 
We first analyze the impact of discretion on the likelihood of parliamentary involvement. Table 4 
indicates that parliaments are significantly more likely to intervene if E.U. acts that provide for more 
implementing discretion are being transposed and conflict intensity is zero,19 that is when the 
implementing measures are adopted by single party majority governments which, according to our 
measurement, display no divergence between the minister in charge transpositon and the supporting 
parliamentary party. Approximately 20 percent of our sample falls into this category. For instance, a 
Spanish parliament, supporting a single party majority government, is 5.3 percent more likely to 
intervene in the transposition of a (unanimously-adopted) Council agricultural directive than in the 
transposition of a Commission directive. In similar circumstances, a Greek parliament is 3.7 percent 
more likely to be involved. Undoubtedly even single party majority governments display their fair 
degree of intra-party disagreement which can explain the greater propensity of parliamentary 
involvement when high-discretion E.U. laws are implemented. 
 
[ FIGURE 3 HERE ] 
 
Figure 3 illustrates that this result holds for other types of parliamentary governments. The figure 
maps the marginal effect and the 95 percent confidence intervals of implementing a unanimously-
adopted Council directive compared to a Commission directive on the probability of parliamentary 
 
18 We have also estimated a model with fourteen country dummy variables (with and without policy dummies) but none 
of the optimization procedures used by the most popular multilevel statistical packages has converged because of serious 
collinearity problems. This should not come as a surprise as the institutional variables measure primarily intra-country 
differences. A model with country and policy dummies can be estimated if we exclude the four institutional variables 
and the related interactive terms. In this circumstance, the marginal effect of discretion is as expected. 
19 An arbitrary rescaling of the variables may change both the size and the significance of the coefficients of the 
constitutive terms of an interaction. Caution is therefore in order when interpreting these effects because none of the 
variables are measured with a natural zero (Brambor, et al., 2005; Braumoeller, 2004). 
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involvement across the observed range of values that conflict intensity takes in our sample.20 As 
expected, the impact remains positive and significant. Discretion and conflict intensity also interact 
rather powerfully. The upward sloping solid curve means that the substantive effect of discretion on 
the likelihood of involvement increases as the divergence between the minister in charge of 
transposition and her coalition partners intensifies. Heterogeneous multi-party coalitions, like those 
we had in Belgium and Finland in past ten years, are almost three times more likely to involve the 
legislature than single party majority governments, when transposing a Council directive compared 
to a Commission directive. 
 
[ FIGURE 4 HERE ] 
 
The institutional variables interact with conflict intensity as expected. Figure 4 plots the marginal 
effects and the confidence intervals of moving from one to the opposite end of the institutional 
design on the probability of legislative participation in policymaking, across the observed range of 
values of conflict intensity. When the executive has significant control over the legislative agenda, 
members of parliament are significantly less likely to interve in the policy process. The effect is 
substantively stronger in more homogeneous coalitions. This result provides further supporting 
evidence on the negative relation between agenda control and legislative activity discovered by 
Döring (1995b). For instance, the French executive has considerable more control over legislative 
proceedings than the Danish one (while the scores for amendment prerogatives and easiness to carry 
motions of confidence are above the median in both countries). The French parliament is more than 
5 percent less likely to be involved in transposition than the Danish Folketinget (admittedly, Danish 
governments have also generally relied on more heterogeneous parliamentary support coalitions 
than the French ones). 
The variable amendment prerogatives behaves only partially as expected. The possibility for the 
executive of enjoying a last offer authority on amendments, compared to no formal advantage, 
dampens legislative involvement in coalitions exhibiting above average levels of internal 
disagreement between the minister and coalition parties (i.e. when conflict intensity exceeds 0.2, 
approximately 40 percent of our sample). This effect increases with the heterogeneity of 
parliamentary support coalitions. Finland and Italy, for instance, have similar confidence vote 
procedures and, in the whole, similar executive tools for controlling the legislative agenda, but the 
Italian government enjoys stronger amendment prerogatives. The Finnish Eduskunta is more than 
twice as likely to intervene in policymaking compared to the Italian parliament.21 At the opposite 
end of the spectrum however, in case of homogeneous coalitions or single party majority 
governments, stronger amendment prerogatives increase the likelihood of parliamentary 
involvement. This result is driven by the British, Irish and Portuguese cases which exhibit below 
average levels of parliamentary involvement and limited government amendment prerogatives. Our 
findings flesh out the rationale behind the correlation between last-offer authority and the incidence 
of minority governments discovered by Heller (2001a: 791-2). This procedural privilege is 
 
20 The marginal effects and confidence intervals have been produced following the code developed by Brambor, Clark 
and Golder (2005). We took 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix. In 
Figures 3 and 4, variables are set at either their mode or mean values (i.e. discretion=0, agenda control = 0.468, 
amendment prerogatives = 3, confidence vote = 4, bicameralism = 3), while policy dummies are set equal to zero. 
21 Finnish governments are also slightly more heterogeneous. 
particularly valuable for minority governments, which, by their very nature, need to rely on 
multifarious coalitions, because it limits parliamentary activism. 
Lastly, Table 4 and Figure 4 indicate that legislative participation in policymaking diminishes if the 
procedural hurdles to invoke and carry a motion of confidence become less demanding. This effect 
tapers off as conflict intensity increases but it is significantly negative in 75 percent of our sample. 
The lower activism of the Belgian parliament compared to the Finnish one could be partially 
explained by the easier-to-carry motion of confidence in Belgium, since these two countries provide 
for broadly similar government prerogatives on legislative agenda setting and amendment 
introduction. Figure 4 also indicates how different procedural features appear to be of value for 
different types of government. If a government wants to keep legislative interference at bay, the 
confidence procedure is more valuable than enjoying amendment prerogatives in case of 
homogeneous coalitions. However, as the support coalition becomes more diverse, using the 
confidence procedure could be risky for government survival22 and relying on amendment 
prerogatives becomes a more effective strategy. 
 
[ TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
The analysis of the impact of an increase in conflict intensity on parliamentary involvement is not 
straightforward. Recall that our two hypotheses predict that more conflict increases the likelihood of 
legislative participation with higher implementing discretion and weaker government’s control tools 
of legislative proceedings. The marginal effect of this predictor depends on the values of five 
conditioning variable, that is discretion and the four institutional variables.23 In Table 5, we list the 
marginal effects of conflict intensity at low and high levels of discretion and for each member state, 
which represents a unique combination of institutional variables. Countries are ranked according to 
the degree of significance of the coefficient in case of high discretion. We have also calculated the 
percentage change in the probability of parliamentary involvement as a result of a state-specific 
standard deviation increase in conflict intensity.24
In support of our first expectation, we can observe a positive, substantively large and, in many cases, 
statistically significant impact that an increase in conflict has on the legislative participation when 
high-discretion directives are been transposed. In case of low-discretion measures, the impact of this 
predictor is negligible. This is further proof of the strong positive interaction between conflict and 
discretion that we have observed in Figure 3. Deeper disagreement between the responsible minister 
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22 Heller (2001a: 782-3) describes the disadvantages of the confidence procedure. 
23 Let Cij be the mean level of conflict intensity across the national transposition measures of 
directive j in country i. Its marginal effect on the probability of parliamentary involvement 
Pr[Pij=1]=Φ(.) is calculated as 
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⋅Φ∂ )( =(β1+ ) Φ'(∑
=
6
2k
ijkkYβ .) where β1 is the coefficient of Cij, βk 
(k=2,...6) are the five coefficients of the interaction terms, and Yijk the five independent variables 
interacting with Cij  (policy dummies are set equal to zero). The standard error of this quantity is 
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k k
kijkkijk YY ββββσ . The term under squared root could take negative values 
since covariances can be negative. In these circumstances, standard errors cannot be calculated.  
24 With the exception of the United Kingdom and Greece, interpreting the marginal effects of conflict intensity in these 
two countries is not particularly meaningful because they have experienced only single party majority governments. 
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and her coalition parties is likely to increase legislative participation in policymaking if the E.U. 
measure being implemented confers enough latitude to national political actors for manipulating the 
final policy outcome. 
The ranking of countries provides support for the second expectation. Austria, Finland, Germany 
and, with one exception, Luxembourg have values for the three significant institutional variables 
(agenda control, amendment prerogatives and confidence vote) at or below the median.25 In these 
countries, the institutional environment protects the legislature from interference from the executive, 
we can see therefore greater parliamentary involvement in policymaking under the right 
combination of opportunities and risks. 
The institutional environment of the countries in the middle of the table provides instead for some 
tools of executive control of legislative proceedings.26 Hence, if increased divergence from the 
views of the responsible minister represents a risk for coalition parties, especially in case of high-
discretion laws, the possibilities of executive control of parliamentary activity dampens the 
incentives to participate in policymaking. Lastly, the executives of the countries at the bottom of 
Table 5 enjoy a wide array of institutional tools to control legislative activity,27 with the result of 
considerably discouraging parliamentary involvement. 
We conclude with an examination of the policy effects. Legislatures are significantly more likely to 
intervene in policymaking, compared to the agricultural policy baseline, in all but one policy areas. 
Home affairs, public administration, taxation, social policy and public health reveal much higher 
levels of parliamentary involvement. If we keep the other variables at either their mean or mode 
values, the probability of involvement increases by 23.6 percent in case of directives on home 
affairs, 17.1 percent for public administration measures, 15.3 percent for taxation directives, 12.9 
and 9.1 percent for social policy and public health measures respectively. The effect is smaller but 
still significantly greater than zero in the remaining two policy areas (3.1 and 2.2 percent for 
industrial and environmental policy directives respectively). As it becomes apparent when looking at 
Table 2, the discriminant factor between the groups of policies with low parliamentary involvement 
(agricultural, transport, environmental and industrial policy) and the other areas is the volume of 
policy output produced at the supranational level. Even controlling for implementing discretion, it 
seems that areas that are intensively europeanized dampen the incentives for parliamentary 
participation in the policy process, maybe because members of parliament see fewer opportunities 
for shifting the outcome towards their preferred direction. 
 
Conclusion 
For decades, it has been acknowledged that institutions matter. The interesting question is however 
how they matter. Taking the lead from Martin and Vanberg (2005), we have presented and 
empirically tested a model of policy-making in European parliamentary systems where a coalition 
partner uses the legislative process to counteract the risk of ministerial drift in the implementation of 
E.U. directives. The model shows that formal opportunities for implementation drift, designed into 
 
25 The value of agenda control for Luxembourg is only slightly above the median. Belgium could also be associated 
with this group were it not for the fact that it tops the ranking of the confidence vote scores.  
26 The Netherlands, Italy and Sweden rank low in agenda control, high in amendment prerogatives and middle in 
confidence vote. Spain has similar institutional features, but it ranks higher in agenda control. Portugal ranks at or just 
slightly above the median for these three variables. 
27 France and Ireland display at or above median values for the three institutional variables. Denmark ranks lower than 
the median only for agenda control. 
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E.U. law, in combination with policy conflict within the governing coalition increases the 
probability of legislative involvement. Furthermore, institutional features that strengthen the hand of 
the government vis-à-vis the parliament decrease the chance of legislative involvement for a given 
level of disagreement within the government. These expectations were empirically supported when 
tested on a large dataset of implementing measures of E.U. directives in fifteen European countries.   
These results have far-reaching implications for the literature on legislative–executive relations 
which has been dominated by cabinet-centered studies. First, they confirm the findings of Martin 
and Vanberg (2005) about the central role of the legislative process in managing intra-coalitional 
disagreement on a much larger dataset and group of countries. Second, in the spirit of Döring’s 
(1995d) seminal work, they highlight the crucial intervining role of parliamentary institutions. 
Government’s control of the legislative agenda, its advantage in scheduling parliamentary 
amendments and the ease with which it can pass a motion of confidence decrease the involvement of 
parliament in policy-making. Only bicameralism does not seem to matter, reinforcing Cutrone and 
McCarty’s (2006) conclusions. The first two findings suggest that researchers interested in 
legislative politics should pay particular attention to the ordering of proposals when analyzing 
voting behavior in parliaments (see Clinton, 2007). The third result adds empirical evidence to the 
theoretical importance of the confidence vote procedure highlighted by, for instance, Diermeier and 
Feddersen (1998) and Huber (1996b). 
In conclusion, the legislative process provides an important mechanism for managing 
intracoalitional conflicts in European parliamentary systems but this function is mediated by the 
institutional rules governing legislative–executive relations and the formal opportunities for 
implementation drift. 
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Table 1 Party P’s Preferences for Implementation Paths 
 
Minister M: policy preferences 
 ⏐m⏐ < d m > d m < -d 
 
p < d 
UE= - |m–p| 
UL= -a|m–p| - c 
Legislative route iff 
(1 – a) |m – p| > c 
UE= p - d 
UL= a (p – d) - c 
Legislative route iff 
(1 - a) (d - p) >  c 
UE= -d – p 
UL= -a (d + p) - c 
Legislative route iff 
(1 - a) (d + p) > c 
 
 
 
 
 
Coalition party 
P: policy 
preferences 
 
p > d U
E= m – p 
UL= d – p - a(d – m) - c
Legislative route iff 
(1 - a) (d – m) > c 
UE= d - p 
UL= d - p - c 
Legislative route iff 
c < 0 (never) 
UE= -d – p 
UL= (1-2a)d – p - c 
Legislative route iff 
2d(1-a) > c 
 
 
 
Table 2 Policy Areas and Responsible Ministers 
Policy area Types of issues Responsible minister Number of directives 
Agriculture Agriculture, fisheries Minister of Agriculture 1,898 
Environment 
Environment, renewable energy, 
approximation of environmentally-related 
laws, consumer information on environment 
Minister of 
Environment 607 
Interior / 
Home Affairs 
Security and justice, people's Europe, free 
movement of persons, European citizenship 
Minister of Interior / 
Home Affairs 54 
Industry / 
Trade 
Customs union, free movement of goods, right 
of establishment, freedom to provide services, 
competition, commercial policy, energy, 
industrial policy, internal market, consumer 
protection, law relating to undertakings 
Minister of Industry / 
Trade / Economy 2,147 
Public 
Administration 
Public contracts, application of competition 
rules to public undertakings 
Minister of Public 
Administration / 
Public Works 
45 
Public Health Health protection Minister of Public Health 31 
Social Affairs 
/ Employment Social policy 
Minister of Social 
Affairs / Employment 175 
Finance / 
Treasury 
Taxation, mutual tax assistance, transport 
taxation, free movement of capital Minister of Finance 186 
Transport 
Transport policy, right of establishment and 
freedom to provide transport services, 
summer-time arrangements, approximation of 
motor vehicles laws 
Minister of Transport 946 
Note: Grouping broadly follows EUR-Lex classification headings. N = 6,089 
 
 
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics     
Variable Description Minimum Mean Maximum St.Dev. 
Dependent Variable     
Parliamentary 
involvement 
1 if there is a legislative national 
implementation measure 0 0.136 1  
Independent Variables     
Discretion Implementing discretion granted to national authorities in a directive 0 0.730 2 0.725 
Conflict 
intensity 
Left-right distance between 
responsible minister and coalition 
parties when adopting national 
measures 
0 0.159 0.56 0.129 
Agenda control Extent of government control of legislative agenda 0 0.468 1 0.280 
Amendment 
prerogatives 
Extent of government amendment 
authority towards the end of the 
legislative process 
1 2.216 3 0.856 
Confidence 
vote 
Easiness to invoke and carry 
motions of confidence 1 4.396 7 1.335 
Bicameralism Degree of symmetry and incongruence of upper houses 1 2.184 4 0.996 
 
 
 
Table 4 Discretion, Conflict, Institutions and Parliamentary Involvement 
Dependent variable: Parliamentary involvement  
Parameters Coefficients (robust s.e.) 
Coefficients 
(robust s.e. clustered on 
country level ) 
Fixed Effects   
Intercept -1.914
**
(0.242) 
-1.995**
(0.125) 
Discretion 0.153
*
(0.068) 
0.176 
(0.103) 
Conflict intensity 4.638
**
(1.189) 
4.773**
(0.656) 
Agenda control -0.493
**
(0.175) 
-0.523 
(0.314) 
Amendment prerogatives 0.286
**
(0.048) 
0.294**
(0.043) 
Confidence vote -0.069 (0.038) 
-0.088**
(0.027) 
Bicameralism -0.07 (0.042) 
-0.089**
(0.033) 
Conflict Intensity ×  Discretion 1.786**(0.326) 1.469
**
(0.203) 
                             ×  Agenda control -1.468 (0.786) -1.042 (1.137) 
                             ×  Amendment prerogatives -1.784**(0.273) -1.711
**
(0.216) 
                             ×  Confidence vote -0.669**(0.185) -0.534
**
(0.127) 
                             ×  Bicameralism 0.215 (0.229) 0.310 (0.209) 
Environment 0.467
**
(0.155) 
0.514**
(0.149) 
Interior 1.633
**
(0.386) 
1.642**
(0.220) 
Industry 0.588
**
(0.111) 
0.664**
(0.074) 
Public administration 1.408
**
(0.291) 
1.461**
(0.057) 
Public health 1.046
**
(0.264) 
1.064**
(0.338) 
Social affairs 1.238
**
(0.254) 
1.254**
(0.236) 
Finance 1.336
**
(0.229) 
1.344**
(0.185) 
Transport 0.220 (0.122) 
0.230**
(0.075) 
Random Effects   
Variance, intercept 0.395 (0.080) 
0.837 
(0.042) 
Slope variance, Conflict intensity 2.098 (1.028) 
 
Log-likelihood -1834.187 -1842.779 
Note: Probit regression with random-intercept and random-coefficient for conflict intensity. N= 6,089 
(directive-level N= 724). Maximum likelihood estimates. ** = p < .01, * = p < .05. 
 
 
 
Table 5 The Marginal Effects of Conflict Intensity 
Country Low discretion 
Percentage Change 
Pr[Parliamentary 
involvement] 
High 
discretion 
Percentage Change 
Pr[Parliamentary 
involvement] 
N 
Austria 2.019 (0.808)* 0.3 
5.590 
(0.993)** 2.6 155 
Finland 0.011 (0.407) 0.0 
3.582 
(0.705)** 14.0 142 
Luxembourg -0.205 (0.424) 0.0 
3.366 
(0.716)** 1.2 539 
Germany -0.532 (0.624) -0.1 
3.039 
(0.849)** 3.6 370 
United Kingdom 
-1.421 
(0.742)† ° 
2.150 
(0.940)* ° 394 
Belgium -1.583 (0.672)* -0.1 
1.988 
(0.885)* 3.1 484 
Spain -2.100 (0.524)** -1.4 
1.472 
(0.779)† 3.3 486 
Portugal -2.713 (n/a) -0.6 
0.858 
(0.532) 1.0 471 
Netherlands -2.745 (0.217)** -0.5 
0.826 
(0.616) 1.4 416 
Italy -3.053 (0.091)** -0.4 
0.518 
(0.584) 1.0 555 
Sweden -3.213 (n/a) -0.1 
0.358 
(0.489) 0.0 159 
Ireland -3.257 (0.501)** -0.1 
0.314 
(0.764) 0.2 504 
Greece -4.176 (n/a) ° 
-0.604 
(0.565) ° 498 
Denmark -4.431 (n/a) -0.2 
-0.860 
(0.450)† -0.6 432 
France -5.091 (0.395)** -0.2 
-1.519 
(0.699)* -0.5 484 
Note: Low and high discretion take the values of zero and two respectively, policy dummies are set 
equal to zero. Standard errors in parenthesis. ** = p < .01, * = p < .05, † = p < .1. n/a= standard error is 
the squared root of a negative number. Percentage change in the probability of parliamentary 
involvement resulting from a state-specific standard deviation increase in conflict intensity. ° Only 
single party majority governments, standard deviation is zero 
 
  
Figure 1 Moves of the Games 
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implementing measure nM 
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Figure 2 Implementation Paths Equilibria 
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Marginal Effect of Discretion for Levels of Conflict 
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Figure 4 
Marginal Effects of Institutional Variables for Levels of Conflict 
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